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ABSTRACT
Public water utilities are tasked with providing high quality, inexpensive water
often sourced from watersheds representing a diverse mix of public and private land
ownership. There is increasing recognition amongst water resource managers of the role
that private landowners play in determining downstream water quality, but bringing
together landowners with a wide variety of land management objectives under the umbrella
of watershed stewardship has proven difficult. Recently, a large number of “Payment for
Watershed Services” programs have aimed to engage private landowners in watershed
stewardship initiatives by offering financial incentives for adopting watershed best
management practices. However, a growing field of research suggests that financial
incentives alone may be of limited utility to encourage widespread and long-standing
behavior change, and instead understanding landowner attitudes and non-financial barriers
to stewardship program enrollment has become a focus of research.
This research examines a population of rural landowners representing a diversity
of agricultural, forestry, recreational, and investment objectives in the Clackamas River
watershed, Oregon. I designed and distributed a mail and web-based survey instrument
intended to measure land uses and land ownership objectives, attitudes towards watershed
stewardship programs, barriers to enrollment in stewardship programs, and preferred
incentives and goals that would promote enrollment. I received 281 valid responses for a
response rate of 29%. I conducted two primary analyses: one focused on relating attitudes
and barriers to intent to enroll in a watershed stewardship program, and one focused on
identifying how diverse landowners differ according to factors influencing enrollment in
stewardship programs. I found that landowners did not report financial considerations to
i

be a primary barrier to enrollment and expressed low interest in receiving financial
incentives. Instead, landowners reported that primary barriers related to lack of trust,
ecological understanding, and concerns that stewardship program enrollment would be
incompatible with their land management objectives. I do not discount the potential utility
of financial incentives under certain circumstances, but emphasize the importance of
addressing these other considerations before incentives can make a meaningful impact.
I compared how barriers to enrollment were perceived by landowners with different
land management objectives relating to production, investment, and conservation. I found
that landowner attitudes were differentiated from one another primarily by their use of land
for production purposes; however, I found a large amount of diversity between producers
and non-producers in the degree to which they considered investment and conservation
objectives in their land management, and these two variables added further explanatory
power to understanding fine-scale differences in how landowner typologies relate to
conservation programs.
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INTRODUCTION
Spurred by the 1996 Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments that required
assessment of public drinking water sources, many public water utilities have established
source watershed protection programs aimed at addressing upstream land uses to preserve
downstream drinking water quality (Bennett et al. 2014). However, a substantial portion of
drinking watersheds are in private ownership, and bringing together landowners with a
diverse array of land management objectives under the umbrella of watershed stewardship
has proven difficult. Private rural land uses may negatively impact water quality through
storm water runoff laden with pesticides, excess nutrient loadings from fertilizers, and
irrigation runoff that adds salts and other pollutants into water supplies (Halcrow et al.
1982). Land conversion and deforestation may remove bank-stabilizing riparian
vegetation, leading to increased soil erosion and suspended sediment in the water column,
and the loss of shade in riparian zones may cause thermal pollution by exposing waterways
to excess sunlight (Karr & Schlosser 1978). The results can pose serious threats to aquatic
life and can substantially increase the cost of treatment for downstream drinking water
(Freeman 2008).
Despite the potential negative impacts of private rural land use, water resource
managers increasingly recognize that many private landowners can and do act as watershed
stewards through careful land management and protection of riparian zones (Ahnstrom
2008, Engel et al. 2008). As a result, a growing number of source watershed protection
programs have utilized a “payment for watershed services” (PWS) framework to provide
financial incentives to encourage or reward stewardship behaviors (Bennett et al. 2014).
Such behaviors may include a variety of watershed-friendly land management practices,
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including maintenance or creation of riparian forests, nutrient load offsets, or wildfire
mitigation activities (Bennett et al. 2014).
Payment for Watershed Services is not a new idea. For decades, the US Department
of Agriculture (USDA) has incentivized the use of riparian buffers through its
Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP), and until 2014 promoted Wetlands
Conservation through the Wetlands Reserve Program. Though not specifically focused on
watersheds, funds from the Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP), the Conservation
Reserve Program (CRP), and the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) have
all been leveraged to assist landowners in implementation of best watershed management
practices (Wood 1999). More recently, PWS programs have been established by water
utilities primarily structured around protecting drinking water to remain in compliance with
federal regulations and to avoid the construction of expensive treatment plants (Bennett
2014). Lurie et al. (2013) argue that local water utilities can play a particularly effective
role in promoting watershed stewardship because of their significant knowledge with the
watershed’s social and ecological context. Notable examples of municipal PWS programs
include the New York City Source Watershed Protection Program (New York), the Eugene
Water and Electric Board’s Voluntary Incentives Program (Oregon), and the Raleigh
Upper Neuse Clean Water Initiative (North Carolina).
Despite the frequent use of incentives to promote stewardship behaviors, many
incentive programs have been unable to achieve widespread enrollment and have been
critiqued for providing insufficient payments to adequately compensate farmers (Engel
2008). Furthermore, Pirard et al. (2010) noted that incentives may only lead to temporary
behavior changes that may revert after payments have ended. While incentive programs
2

are intended to address financial barriers to land stewardship, they may not fully consider
social factors, knowledge, and technological limitations (Ahnstrom 2008). Schneider and
Ingram (1990) argue that knowledge of a population’s motivations, attitudes, and barriers
towards a given action is vital to designing effective programs. While PWS programs
address financial barriers, a growing body of research suggests that non-financial factors
such as attitude, personal values, sense of place, or social obligation may play a greater and
more durable influence on landowner land stewardship decisions.
Research Overview
This research is guided by three primary objectives: (1) to evaluate the efficacy of
financial incentives to promote enrollment in stewardship programs, (2) to gain insight into
the relationship between attitude and land stewardship, and (3) to offer recommendations
regarding how resource managers can effectively engage the landowner populace. Given
the large number of water utilities applying a PWS framework, this research is centered
around understanding enrollment in non-governmental stewardship programs. I evaluate
these questions through two chapters; the first investigates the relationship between intent
to enroll in stewardship programs and attitudes relating to financial and non-financial
considerations. The second explores how diverse landowners perceive different barriers to
enrollment and prefer different methods to engage with stewardship programs. Both of
these chapters are geared towards providing policy-makers additional insight into the range
of policy tools available to apply given a variety of situations.
The project focused on a specific group of rural landowners in the Clackamas River
watershed, Oregon. While findings described in the following chapters provide further
evidence regarding the diversity of attitudes and land management objectives represented
3

by landowners, these findings are intended to be applied primarily to source watershed
protection of the Clackamas River watershed. If one conclusion can be readily made from
this research, it is that understanding the social intricacies of place is absolutely vital to
designing sustainable and equitable land stewardship programs.
Context
The Clackamas River is the center of a 243,000 hectare watershed characterized by
a patchwork of agricultural, semi-urban, and forested lands. Eight separate drinking water
utilities draw drinking water from the Clackamas River and supply water to over 300,000
customers in Washington and Clackamas counties. While the upper 72% of the watershed
is publically owned land primarily in the Mount Hood National Forest, the downstream
portion of the watershed is almost entirely in private agricultural, forestry, and residential
ownership. As such, the watershed offers a complex system representative of a diverse
range of landowners for which to explore these research questions.
In order to maintain water quality amidst increasing development pressure and
production intensity, Clackamas County and the relevant water utilities have formed a
consortium known as the Clackamas River Water Providers (CRWP) to implement source
watershed protection measures (CRWP 2010). The CRWP have noted that the application
of agri-chemicals poses a significant threat to drinking water quality; the United States
Geologic Survey has identified over 1,200 known contaminants in the watershed
(Carpenter 2008), and 17 potentially harmful pesticides have been detected at significant
levels throughout the watershed (Schmidt 2012). Additionally, loss of riparian shade and
excess thermal loads have been identified as priority issues in the watershed (CRWP 2010)
and recently gained media attention due to record water temperatures recorded throughout
4

the basin (Roth 2015). In their 2010 Drinking Water Protection Plan, the CRWP outlined
the need to work with both commercial and small acreage rural landowners in a program
to promote watershed stewardship. This study is aimed at informing the creation of such a
program by understanding attitudes and barriers to enrollment.
Survey Development and Implementation
The primary data used in this research were collected through a questionnaire-based
survey of rural landowners in the Clackamas River watershed. The survey instrument was
designed to measure attitudes and beliefs regarding watershed stewardship, to educate
respondents on the range of features that watershed stewardship programs could take
specific to the Clackamas River watershed, and to identify the diversity of land
management objectives represented in the watershed. The survey was developed with
assistance from the CRWP and was reviewed by resource managers familiar with the
survey sample, including officials representing local water utilities, the Oregon Department
of Agriculture, the United States Geological Survey, and the local Soil and Water
Conservation District.
The questionnaire was administered via mail and web to a randomly selected group
of 1,030 private rural landowners within the Clackamas River watershed. Landowners were
considered eligible if their property was (1) outside of the Urban Growth Boundary; (2) at
least 2 acres in size; (3) zoned as agricultural, rural, or forestry land; and (4) no more than
100 feet from a stream at the property border (Figure 0.1). Because nursery operations have
been noted as a particular concern to water quality in the Clackamas River watershed
(Schmidt 2012), any nursery operating within the watershed was considered eligible and
was contacted to participate in the survey. To enhance response rate (Dillman 2000),
5

landowners were contacted four times from August to September, 2015, via the Dillman
Tailored Design Method, which included an initial postcard, followed up by a first round
of questionnaires, a reminder postcard, and a second wave of questionnaires for nonrespondents.

Figure 0.1
The Clackamas River watershed in Oregon's Willamette River Basin. Eligible tax parcels refer to taxlot
parcels outside of the urban growth boundary, greater than 2 acres in size, and within 100 feet of a
waterbody at the property’s edge.
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CHAPTER ONE
Necessary but not sufficient: Attitudes as motivators and barriers to enrollment in
watershed stewardship programs
In this chapter, I build on past literature by evaluating the relationship between
attitudes, perceived barriers, and land management objectives relating to enrollment in
watershed stewardship programs. I investigate this question through a survey of private
rural residential, agricultural, and forestry landowners in the Clackamas River, OR, and I
apply these findings to discuss policy recommendations to encourage watershed
stewardship amongst landowners.
1. INTRODUCTION
Schneider and Ingram’s well-cited paper “Behavioral Assumptions of Policy
Tools” (1990) stresses that policy-makers may utilize a combination of authority, incentive,
capacity-building, and symbolic tools dependent on local context. The authors argue that
effective use of these tools begins with understanding the relevant population’s motivations
for and barriers to performing the desired action, and to recognize that behavior is
influenced by an individual’s longer-term objectives. Accordingly, PWS programs have
been critiqued for assuming that landowners are limited only by financial considerations,
and monetary incentives are sufficient to promote widespread and long-lasting behavior
change (Engel et al. 2008, Pirard et al. 2010). Coupled with relatively low enrollment rates
in similar programs like the Conservation Reserve Program (Stubbs 2014), these critiques
have prompted a number of researchers to investigate the broader suite of attitudes,
barriers, and non-financial objectives related to landowner stewardship behaviors
(Ahnstrom 2008).
7

1.1 Attitudes as Motivators of Stewardship
Attitude refers to an individual’s favorable or unfavorable appraisal of a behavior
or object in question (Ajzen 1991) and has frequently been used to understand private
landowner motivations for stewardship behaviors. Positive attitudes towards conservation
have been linked with higher program enrollment rates (Ahnstrom 2008), the adoption of
best management practices (Beedell and Rehman 2009, Baumgart-Getz et al. 2012), and
increased success per unit of money invested (Coleman et al. 1992).
Many landowner studies have utilized Ajzen’s (1991) Theory of Planned Behavior
(TPB) as a useful framework for understanding how attitudes relate to the adoption of
conservation behaviors (Beedell and Rehman 1999, Corbett 2002, Rosenberg and
Margerum 2008, Ahnstrom 2008, Armstrong and Stedman 2012, Baumgart-Getz et al.
2012, Thompson et al. 2014). The TPB suggests that a behavior can be understood by
examining three components of attitude: (1) beliefs about the outcome of the behavior, (2)
perceived norms regarding the adoption of the behavior, and (3) the perceived behavioral
control to complete the behavior (Ajzen 1991). Behavior itself is often measured as intent
to perform an action. Though intent does not necessarily correspond directly to observable
behavior, it offers a useful proxy when observed behavior data is not available. Measures
for perceived behavioral control have had relatively low success at explaining stewardship
behavior (e.g. Beedell and Rehman 1999, Corbett 2002), and some have gone so far as to
question whether this concept offers a useful distinction from the other components of
attitude (Trafimow and Duran 1998). Attitudes regarding behavioral outcomes and
social/personal norms, on the other hand, offer more fruitful grounds on which to
understand stewardship behaviors.
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The landowner literature suggests beliefs regarding a behavior’s outcome for both
the environment and oneself influence stewardship behavior. Armstrong and Stedman
(2008) noted the belief that implementation of riparian buffers would lead to improved
watershed outcomes was a key predictor of rural landowner intent to perform that action,
and Baumgart-Getz et al. (2012) reviewed a number of studies and noted that more general
concepts of environmental attitude and awareness may also help predict behavior.
Conversely, Woods et al. (2014) studied a group of producers and noted the importance of
believing that watershed stewardship behaviors would provide personal financial benefit,
whereas behaviors without a perceived personal benefit were perceived less favorably.
Behavioral alignment with social and moral norms is another important component
relating to attitude. The perceived norms of neighbor actions (Fischer and Charnley 2012),
the social norm regarding appearance of a property (Chin et al. 2008), and membership in
social networks (Reimer and Prokopy 2014) have all been related with landowner
stewardship action. Ryan (2009) found that moral norms of stewardship ethic and selfaccountability for water quality were closely associated with stewardship activities of noncommercial riparian landowners.
Despite the large number of studies investigating the relationship between attitude
and the decision to adopt stewardship practices, few look specifically at how landowner
attitudes impact the decision to enroll in stewardship programs. Baumgart-Getz et al.
(2012) analyzed 46 studies relating to farmer adoption of best management practices in the
United States, and only two were specifically focused on factors influencing program
enrollment. This is a significant gap given that stewardship programs are a necessary
medium through which landowner behavior change is encouraged. Of the studies that do
9

focus on enrollment in stewardship programs, the vast majority are heavily focused on
government-sponsored programs (e.g. Esseks and Kraft 1988, Napier et al. 1988, Corbett
2002, Song et al 2014, Reimer and Prokopy 2014). Because government skepticism tends
to influence opinions in the United States (Steel et al. 1994), it is necessary to distinguish
how attitudes relate to enrollment in the growing number of non-government programs
sponsored by drinking water utilities.
1.2 Attitudes as Barriers to Stewardship
While many related studies have been framed around investigating how attitudes
motivate stewardship, it appears that attitudes may also act as substantial barriers to
enrollment in stewardship programs. Kahnemen and Tversky’s (1979) Prospect Theory
provides a strong rationale for consideration of barriers in attitudes modeling. Prospect
theory suggests that individuals make decisions based on perceived losses or gains relative
to their current position, and individuals are more sensitive to losses than they are to gains.
This may suggest that negative attitudes regarding the outcomes of stewardship programs
more have a more potent impact on intent than positive attitudes. As evidence of the
importance of considering attitudes as barriers, landowners have reported support for
environmental and water quality goals in a variety of contexts without correlating directly
to stewardship behavior (e.g. Carr and Tait 1991, Ryan et al. 2003, Greiner et al. 2009).
Evaluation of attitudes as barriers is particularly important given that negative attitudes
have been shown to drive up transaction costs beyond the assessed value of the stewardship
action in question (Grolleau and McCann 2012).
Practical considerations such as perception of financial limitations, knowledge
barriers, and time constraints may partly explain low adoption of stewardship behaviors
10

(Williams 2002, Woods et al. 2014). However, less tangible attitudes relating to lack of
trust in conservation agencies and concerns for loss of private property rights show much
more distinct and consistent negative relationship with stewardship behavior in the
literature (Greiner et al. 2009, Kallstrom and Ljung 2005, Armstrong and Stedman 2011).
In particular, a lack of trust in government appears to be a particularly important barrier to
stewardship (Rosenberg and Margerum 2008, Smith et al. 2013). More broadly, Ma et al.
(2010) included a catch-all measure in the belief that programs are incompatible with land
management goals, and found a significant negative relationship with stewardship
behavior.
1.3 Land Management Objectives
A substantial amount of research suggests that attitudes towards stewardship are
ultimately colored by a landowner’s objectives for managing their land (Majumdar et al.
2008, Greiner et al. 2009). Due to the large footprint of agricultural lands in the United
States, production-based objectives are particularly heavily represented in the literature.
Commonly, producers have been classified as either profit-maximizers or land stewards,
with the notion that these objectives are mutually exclusive (Thompson et al. 2014). While
some evidence supports this dichotomy (e.g. Carr and Tait 1991, Ryan et al. 2003), many
farmers expres an interest in both profit-maximization and land stewardship, creating a sort
of tension that can be difficult to resolve (Sullivan et al. 1996, Thompson et al. 2014). The
complex relationship can be partly understood through a Dual Interest Theory framework,
which suggests that intent to adopt conservation behaviors is driven by weighting the
relative utility of profit objectives and other objectives (Sheeder and Lynne 2011). As
described by Chouinard et al. (2008), “[Producers] may participate in these activities for
11

the social good or because they believe it is the ‘right thing to do’ even if it requires
personal sacrifice.”
While Dual Interest Theory has been less frequently applied to non-operator
landowners, several studies have compared non-operator landowners with their operator
counterparts and have come to seemingly contradictory conclusions that support
application of this framework beyond the typical producer. Kaplowitz and Witter (2008)
found that non-commercial landowners were generally more environmentally aware and
more likely to implement riparian buffers on their property, whereas Armstrong and
Stedman (2011) compared a similar population, and found that residential landowners were
generally less willing to implement buffers due to aesthetic preferences. Such findings
suggest that non-operator landowners are also characterized by diverse motivations.
Despite the lack of consensus, it is clear that whether a landowner relies on their land for
income or not plays an important distinction in how they engage with stewardship
behaviors.
1.4 Research Questions and Hypotheses
While the existing literature has provided a wealth of evidence that attitudes and
land management objectives influence the adoption of land stewardship practices, I aimed
to investigate these concepts in conjunction with one another as part of a conceptual model
to understand intent to enroll in stewardship programs. Based on my literature review, I
compare the relationship between attitudes as motivators and barriers of intent to enroll in
stewardship programs. Because of the low explanatory power associated with perceived
behavioral control, I focus this study on attitudes relating to outcome evaluation and social
and moral norms. I evaluate how production and environmental land management
12

objectives color intent to enroll, with the
hypothesis

that

individuals

interested

primarily in profit will have more negative
attitudes than individuals interested primarily
in protecting the environment, and as a result
will report a lower average intent to enroll
(Figure 1.1).
I place this study in a broader context
by discussing my findings in light of Schneider
and Ingram’s (1990) four classes of policy
tools to address this population’s attitudes,
barriers, and land management objectives
relating to land stewardship. I conclude with

Figure 1.1. A conceptual model of how land
management objectives and attitude relate to
intent to enroll in stewardship programs.

some broadly applicable considerations for
application in source watershed stewardship programs.
2. METHODS
Related to this study, I asked respondents to express their agreement or
disagreement to statements representing attitudes hypothesized to either motivate or to act
as barriers to enrollment in stewardship programs. I measured all responses to these
statements using variations of a 5 point Likert Scale (Likert 1932). Motivating attitudes
were measured by asking respondents to rate degree of agreement or disagreement with (1)
statements regarding interest in receiving incentives to enroll and (2) statements regarding
belief in positive outcomes to both the environment and to self. Barrier attitudes were
13

measured by asking respondents to rate degree of agreement with (1) statements regarding
perceived barriers to enrollment in stewardship programs and (2) statements regarding
belief in negative outcomes to both the environment and to self. Land management
objectives were measured by asking respondents to rate the importance profit/production
objectives and environmental objectives from “not at all important” to “very important.”
Positive and negative outcome beliefs were measured utilizing a modified version of the
Awareness of Consequences and Environmental Concern scale (Stern et al. 1994).
After respondents had completed a series of questions pertaining to potential
program features, the survey asked, “Now that you know a little bit more about the potential
features of a watershed conservation program in the Clackamas River watershed, how
likely would you say you are to participate in such a program if the program was tailored
to your responses above?” This question was designed to measure behavioral intent to
participate in a stewardship program and was used as the dependent variable in my
analyses.
2.3 Data Analysis
All analyses were performed in R Studio (Version 3.2.3). Because the population
contained both rural residential and agricultural properties, I compared demographics and
property characteristics from respondents to both the most recent National Agricultural
Statistics Service Census of Agriculture (USDA 2012) for Clackamas County and the most
recent American Community Survey (US Census Bureau 2009-2013) for census tracts
represented in the study area.
I investigated polychoric correlations between variables (‘Psych’ R Package,
Revelle 2015) in order to avoid potential issues with multi-collinearity. Polychoric
14

correlations are a modified version of the Pearson correlation coefficient used when an
ordinal variable is theorized to represent an underlying normally distributed variable (see
Drasgow 1988) as is the case with Likert-scale data. Highly correlated variables that held
face validity were consolidated into single indices by taking the mean of component
variables. All indices were evaluated for internal consistency using Chronbach’s alpha
(Chronbach 1951).
Though the independent variable – intent to enroll in a watershed stewardship
program – was initially based on a 5-item Likert scale, I transformed this variable to a
dichotomous scale represented by 1 (likely or very likely to enroll) or 0 (not sure, unlikely,
or very unlikely to enroll). I chose this route because my question ultimately was to identify
factors distinguishing the split between likely and unlikely participants, and logistic
regression offered the most statistically robust and easily interpretable technique to
accomplish this goal. Furthermore, logistic regression does not hold strict assumptions
regarding normality and continuity of data, making it appropriate for use with Likert data.
To evaluate the effect of attitudes as both motivators and barriers to enrollment in
stewardship programs, I created two separate logistic regression models – an “attitudes as
motivators model” utilizing variables hypothesized to encourage enrollment intent, and an
“attitudes as barriers model” utilizing variables hypothesized to discourage enrollment
intent. I assessed model significance by performing a chi-square test against a null model
and by calculating the Nagelkerke R2. I weighed variable importance by calculating the
odds ratio for each variable, and I evaluated these models for issues with multi-collinearity
by calculating the variance inflation factor (VIF). Typically, a VIF > 2 indicates potential
multi-collinearity.
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Following the creation of the initial two models, I performed a stepwise model
reduction on each based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), a measure of relative
model quality (Akaike 1973). At each step in this iterative process, the variable most
negatively influencing model quality as evaluated by AIC is dropped before the reduced
set of variables is reevaluated. Following this reduction procedure, remaining variables
from each model were put together into a combined model representing both motivator and
barrier variables. Another stepwise AIC reduction was performed on the combined model
to establish a final model representing the variables explaining the greatest amount of
variance in the dataset.
To evaluate the hypothesized effect land management objective on attitude, I
measured three variables representing profit/production and three variables representing
environmental objectives. I consolidated these into variables into indices by taking the
three-item mean and confirmed the validity of these indices by examining correlations
between variables and calculating Chronbach’s alpha. First, I checked if either of these
variables related to intent to enroll on their own. Then, I weighed these two variables
against one another by taking the difference between the two indices and creating a new
variable termed “land management orientation.” Theoretically, this variable represents
individuals who consider environmental objectives more important than profit/production
objectives by positive values and individuals with inverse objectives by negative values.
Based on this variable, I split the sample into three classes of landowners: Profit/Production
Oriented, Neutrally Oriented, and Environmentally Oriented. I then utilized the final
attitudes model to evaluated how these groups differ in predicted enrollment intent. I
compared how these groups differed relating to each variable represented in the combined
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attitude model using a Tukey HSD test (Tukey 1949), and evaluated how this relates to
intent to enroll by comparing differences in predicted intent to enroll as defined by the
combined model.
3. RESULTS
Seventy-two surveys (6.5%) were returned as undeliverable, leading to an effective
sample of 958. I received 279 valid responses – a 29% response rate. Compared with the
reference data sources, the sample tended to be older (median age 63) and more educated
(48% with a college degree). Property size, agricultural sales, gender, and income tended
to fall within the range of values represented by the reference sources (Table 1.1).
Table 1.1
Summary of demographic and property characteristics of survey respondents.
Sample Size
Median Property Size (Acres)

281
19.3

Median Age (Years)

63

% Male

64.2%

% College Graduate

47.6%

% Conservative

48.1%

% Without Sales in 2014

58.8%

% Liberal

27.0%

% With Sales > $1000 in 2014

31.9%

% Income > $75K

56.5%

3.1 Data Summary
I was able to consolidate measured variables into simplified indices to reduce the
total number of variables used in the attitudes modeling. Inter-variable correlations
revealed two constructs within the measured attitude items: “Financial Incentives” (alpha
= 0.92) represents four variables expressing interest in receiving monetary incentives,
whereas “Social Barriers” (alpha = 0.71) represents three variables expressing the influence
of one’s neighbors or community to prevent enrollment. The highest rated motivator
attitudes were the beliefs that functioning stream ecosystems are important for a clean
water supply (the Ecosystem Belief, mean = 4.35), that watershed conservation benefits
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everyone in the watershed (the Universal Benefit Belief, mean = 3.75), and that watershed
conservation is the right thing to do (the Moral Belief, mean = 3.72). Respondents
frequently cited practical barriers to enrollment, including the perception of insufficient
information (Informational Barriers, mean = 3.83), finances (Financial Barriers, mean =
3.23) and time (Time Barriers, mean = 3.12). Furthermore, many respondents reported less
concrete concerns that enrollment could lead to regulatory implications (Regulatory
Barriers, mean = 3.73) and they lacked trust in conservation agencies or organizations
(Trust Barriers, mean = 3.32). Generally, individuals reported more positive attitudes
towards watershed stewardship than they did negative attitudes, but they also were more
likely to report perceived barriers compared with expressing an interest in receiving
incentives to enroll (Table 1.2).
My analysis confirmed the existence of two distinct land management objectives:
Profit/Production Objectives (alpha = 0.86) and Environmental Objectives (alpha = 0.82)
(Table 1.2). Profit/Production Objectives represented three variables relating to the
importance of producing farm or timber products, providing income, and managing a
business through land production. Environmental Objectives represented three variables
relating to the importance of protecting open space and aesthetic beauty, the health of
waterways, and native wildlife and vegetation. Environmental Objectives (mean = 4.11)
were reported much more frequently than Profit/Production Objectives (mean = 2.53).
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Table 1.2
Summary of single-item and indexed variables representing attitudes as motivators, attitudes as barriers,
and land management objectives. Bolded items were utilized in logistic regression. The groupings represent
responses to the following questions: (Panel A) “Would the following increase your interest in working with
a watershed conservation program?” (Panel B) “In general, do you agree or disagree with the following
statements regarding watershed conservation in the Clackamas River watershed?” (Panel C) “To what
extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about why you might NOT participate in a
watershed conservation program?” (4) “How important are the following factors when you are making
decisions regarding your land?”

Barriers
Beliefs

Beliefs

3Expressed

4Objectives

2Outcome

2Outcome

1Interest

in
Incentives

Panel A. Attitudes as Motivators: variables hypothesized to encourage intent to enroll
Marketing: Improved marketing for products from my land (n=251)
Technical Assistance: Staff to help you implement your project (n=252)
Financial (alpha = 0.92) (n=256)
Annual cash incentives for participating (n=255)
Mean One-time cash bonus for signing up (n=254)
A cash bonus for joint participation with neighbors (n=253)
Discounts at local retailers (n=249)
Universal Benefit: Watershed conservation benefits everyone (n=251)
Moral: Watershed conservation is just the right thing to do (n=249)
Public Health: The effects of water pollution on public health are worse than we
realize (n=249)
Responsibility: Pollution from my land harms people downstream (n=250)
Degradation: Development threatens water quality (n=247)
Ecosystem: Functioning ecosystems are important for clean water (n=248)
Panel B. Attitudes as Barriers: variables hypothesized to discourage intent to enroll
Time: I don't have time to participate in a program like this (n=247)
Financial: My finances won't allow it (n=248)
Informational: I don't know enough about these programs (n=248)
Social (alpha = 0.71) (n=246)
My neighbors or community would give me a hard time (n=244)
No one in my community participates in these types of programs (n=244)
I'm uncomfortable with the attention programs like these bring (n=246)
Trust: I don't trust the organizations that run these programs (n=244)
Regulatory: I’m concerned about legal or regulatory implications (n=244)
Incompatible: Conservation programs are incompatible with my goals (n=263)
Threat to livelihood: Watershed conservation will threaten my livelihood
Restrictive: Watershed conservation might limit my personal freedoms (n=250)
Denial: While some local areas may have seen declines in water quality, overall
water quality in the watershed is not in decline (n=249)
Panel C. Land Management Objectives: importance to land management decisions
Profit / Production (alpha = 0.86) (n=262)
Produce high quality farm or timber products for market (n=259)
Provide income for me and my family (n=260)
Grow/manage a business through my land's production (n=256)
Environmental (alpha = 0.82) (n=267)
Preserve open space or aesthetic beauty (n=262)
Protect the health of waterways on or near my property (n=264)
Protect local wildlife or native vegetation (n=266)

Mean
2.67
3.17
3.20
3.42
3.25
3.07
3.03
3.75
3.88

SD
1.30
1.35
1.21
1.35
1.34
1.33
1.36
1.12
1.01

3.72
2.62
3.62
4.35
Mean
3.12
3.23
3.83
2.63
2.45
2.61
2.80
3.32
3.73
2.46
2.40
3.25

1.10
1.50
1.19
0.81
SD
1.15
1.10
1.15
0.87
1.04
0.92
1.24
1.20
1.21
1.12
1.15
1.25

2.86

1.03

Mean
2.53
2.75
2.53
2.25
4.11
3.98
4.21
4.14

SD
1.39
1.70
1.50
1.46
0.96
1.23
1.05
1.04
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3.2 Logistic Regression Models
The attitudes as motivators model revealed three variables that held a significant
positive relationship (α<0.1) with intent to participate: Technical Assistance Incentives
(p<0.001), the Universal Benefit Belief (p=0.034), and the Ecosystem Belief (p=0.008)
(Table 1.3). Stepwise AIC reduction revealed no additional variables contributing to model
quality. The Ecosystem Belief had the highest odds ratio (odds=2.557), indicating that the
model was particularly sensitive to this variable. The model was highly significant when
compared against the null model (p<0.001, Nagelkerke R2=0.411).
The attitudes as barriers model revealed three variables to hold a significant
negative relationship (α<0.1) with intent: Trust Barriers (p=0.086), the Incompatible Belief
(p<0.001), and the Threat to Livelihood Belief (p=0.061) (Table 1.3). Stepwise AIC
reduction suggested that Time Barriers (p=0.193) and Social Barriers (p=0.112) contribute
to model quality, and so these variables were maintained for inclusion in the combined
model. The Incompatible Belief had the lowest odds ratio (odds=0.498), indicating that
intent seemed to be particularly sensitive to this variable. The model performed similarly
to the encouraging factors model and was highly significant compared against the null
(p<0.001; Nagelkerke R2 = 0.369).
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Combined Model

Barrier Attitude Model

Motivator Attitude Model

Table 1.3
Logistic Regression model output comparing motivator, barrier, and combined models (*p < 0.1).
Contrib
Variable
β
S.E.
p-val
VIF
Odds Ratio
AIC?
Marketing Incentives
-0.204
0.173
0.240
1.619
0.816
Technical Assistance
0.713
0.195
0.000*
1.579
2.040
✓
Financial Incentives
0.214
0.198
0.279
1.490
1.238
Universal Benefit Belief
0.437
0.206
0.034*
1.379
1.548
✓
Moral Belief
0.255
0.254
0.315
1.578
1.291
Public Health Belief
-0.152
0.210
0.467
1.507
0.859
Responsibility Belief
0.152
0.124
0.222
1.183
1.164
Degradation Belief
-0.252
0.186
0.174
1.428
0.777
Ecosystem Belief
0.988
0.371
0.008*
1.357
2.686
✓
Contrib
Variable
β
S.E.
p-val
VIF
Odds Ratio
AIC?
Time Barriers
-0.251
0.193
0.193
1.439
0.778
✓
Financial Barriers
-0.112
0.196
0.570
1.394
0.894
Social Barriers
-0.383
0.241
0.112
1.211
0.682
✓
Trust Barriers
-0.282
0.164
0.086*
1.183
0.754
✓
Informational Barriers
0.032
0.161
0.842
1.085
1.033
Incompatible Belief
-0.684
0.180
0.000*
1.135
0.505
✓
Threat to livelihood Belief
-0.315
0.169
0.061*
1.167
0.729
✓
Restrictive Belief
0.053
0.163
0.747
1.363
1.054
Denial Belief
-0.131
0.192
0.494
1.207
0.877
Contrib
Variable
β
S.E.
p-val
VIF
Odds Ratio
AIC?
Time Barriers
-0.302
0.175
0.085*
1.039
0.740
✓
Trust Barriers
-0.325
0.169
0.054*
1.090
0.723
✓
Incompatible Belief
-0.425
0.192
0.027*
1.094
0.654
✓
Threat to Livelihood Belief
-0.423
0.171
0.013*
1.080
0.655
✓
Technical Assistance
0.638
0.173
0.000*
1.075
1.893
✓
Ecosystem Belief
0.653
0.310
0.035*
1.087
1.922
✓
2
Model Comparison
n
df
p-val (χ )
Nagelkerke R2
Motivator Attitude
220
210
1.11E-12*
0.411
Barrier Attitude Model
222
212
3.41E-11*
0.369
Combined Attitude
217
210
2.20E-16*
0.476

The combined attitude model contained six variables consisting of Time Barriers
(p=0.085), Trust Barriers (p=0.054), the Incompatible Belief (p=0.084), the Threat to
Livelihood Belief (p=0.013), Technical Assistance Incentives (p<0.001), and the
Ecosystem Belief (p=0.035). This combined model was highly significant (p<0.001) and
performed better than either the negative or positive models independently (Nagelkerke
R2=0.476).
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For these six variables, I developed partial regression probability curves that isolate
the impact of each variable by outputting predicted probabilities for that variable while
holding all other variables constant at their mean. Amongst the variables I found to
significantly explain intent to enroll, each performed substantially better at explaining a
lack of intent to enroll rather than intent to enroll; amongst respondents who reported
negative attitudes, the model uniformly predicted an intent to enroll of near 0 (Figure 1.2).
Likewise, the positive attitude variables never predicted a probability of enrollment greater
than 50%, but not holding positive attitudes almost guaranteed a total lack of intent to
enroll.

Figure 1.2
Partial regression
curves for the six
attitude variables
represented in the
combined model.
Note that these
represent the
influence of each of
these variables on
intent to enroll with
all other variables
held constant at their
mean.

3.3 Land Management Orientation
I classified 23 respondents as “Profit/Production” oriented (Land Management
Orientation < 0), 83 respondents as “Neutral” (0 > Land Management Orientation < 2)
and 103 respondents as “Environmental” (Land Management Orientation > 2) (Figure
1.3.1). Neutral individuals were classified as such because, despite having a slight edge
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towards environmental objectives, they tended to fall in the middle of the respondent
distribution and thus represented no strong land management orientation compared with
the rest of the population.
Figure 1.3.2 shows the cumulative distribution of predicted enrollment probability
for each of the three groups. The Tukey HSD test between groups showed a significant
difference between the Environmental and Neutral groups (p=0.011) and between
Environmental and Profit/Production groups (p=0.001). However, I did not detect a
difference in predicted intent to enroll probability between the Neutral and
Profit/Production groups (p=0.210). In general, I noted an increasing average predicted
enrollment intent from profit/production to neutral to environmental groups, and this
matched trends seen in the observed data.

Figure 1.3
(1) Kernel density distribution of Land Management Orientation, split by group. (2) Cumulative
distribution curve of predicted probabilities as a function of attitude compared between land
management orientation groups. Significant differences between groups (Tukey HSD α<0.05) are
indicated by associated letters A, B, and C.
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Figure 1.4
Mean and standard error bars of combined model variables by land management orientation (n = 208).
Significant differences between groups (Tukey HSD α<0.1) is indicated by associated letters A, B, and C.

When comparing differences between groups for each variable, I found that
Profit/Production oriented landowners were the most likely (α<0.1) to perceive Trust
Barriers and to report the Incompatible Belief, followed by Neutral respondents and
Environmental respondents. I found similar relationships in the perception of Time Barriers
and the Threat to Livelihood Belief. Environmentally oriented landowners were
significantly more likely to hold the Ecosystem Belief compared with Profit/Production
oriented landowners. I found no difference between groups in relation to interest in
Technical Assistance Incentives (Figure 1.4).
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4. DISCUSSION
Though response rate was lower than anticipated, it is not unprecedented for this
population; a previous questionnaire of agricultural landowners in the watershed conducted
by the Clackamas River Basin Council in 2013 used the same methods and reported a
20.3% response rate. I found strong support for my initial conceptual model that attitudes
can act as both motivators and barriers to enrollment in watershed stewardship programs.
Furthermore, my findings support the hypothesis that land management objectives color
attitudes that are relevant to enrollment intent. However, the relationship between land
management objective, attitude, and enrollment intent was more complicated than I
anticipated.
Previous studies have noted a positive relationship between environmental
objectives and stewardship practices (Greiner et al. 2009, Arbuckle et al. 2009). Though I
found that many individuals reported a high importance of protecting the environment and
local waterways through their land management, this did not correspond to intent to enroll
in a watershed stewardship program. These findings indicate that respondents tended to
consider protection of the environment to be a moral imperative to be completed by selfinitiative, rather than through a formalized program to accomplish this goal. One
respondent noted, “We have always maintained [our land] by ourselves without outside
help or interference.” These findings suggest that a lack of intent to enroll does not indicate
an aversion to stewardship, but it appears that attitudes may prevent enrollment in
stewardship programs.
Likewise, I found no relationship between profit/production objectives and intent
to enroll. McCann et al. (1997) reported a similar finding; they surveyed conventional and
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organic farmers, and found no difference with regard to the percent of their incomes
derived from farming. However, they did find a difference between environmental attitudes
of conventional and organic farmers, suggesting that land management objectives may play
an unresolved role in attitude. I examined this role by evaluating the relative importance of
profit/production objectives and environmental objectives through the “land management
orientation” index, and I found that when profit/production objectives took precedence
over environmental objectives, attitudes were significantly more negative (Figure 1.4) and
lead to a lower intent to enroll (Figure 1.3.2).
Carr and Tait (1991) surveyed farmers in the UK, and found that profit/production
motives tended to take precedence over environmental motives. My findings suggest that
relatively few respondents (n=23) reported profit/production motives to be substantially
more important than environmental motives; however, individuals who reported similar
influences of profit/production and environmental motives were less likely to report
enrollment intent compared with purely environmentally motivated individuals. This
indicates that environmental and profit/production motives on their own are not
prerequisite or exclusive of enrollment in stewardship programs, but the relationship
between these variables can help to explain differences in attitude. Profit/production
objectives appear to moderate the influence of environmental considerations and lead to a
lower predicted enrollment intent.
When I examined how attitudes relate to enrollment, I found that attitudes
uniformly predict a lack of enrollment intent as opposed to intent; this suggests that
attitudes are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions that must be addressed in order to
ensure enrollment. The application of Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) may
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offer an additional explanation of the relationship between attitude and intent. While I
initially proposed the use of Prospect Theory as rationale for including negative attitudes
in the model, my findings suggest that negative attitudes not only play an important role in
influencing decision making, but in fact individuals seem to avoid action based on negative
attitudes, whereas positive attitudes seem to have a less clearly defined relationship with
behavioral intent. Interestingly, Ljung et al. (2012) found a similar concept to be true
regarding attitudes towards hunting: negative attitudes universally predicted a lack of intent
to hunt, but positive attitudes had little relationship to the act of hunting itself. Heberlein
(2012) explains this phenomenon can be observed because possessing positive attitudes
towards an action does not necessarily correspond to possessing the means to complete that
action.
It seems that holding each of the appropriate attitudes independent of one another
is not enough, and as such program tools should aim to address these attitudes in
conjunction with one another. In order to further elaborate which policy tools are likely to
be useful in the context of these findings, I return to Schneider and Ingram’s (1990) policy
tools to help understand effective means of engaging this population in watershed
stewardship.
Authority Tools prohibit or require action through enforceable regulation. Though
I did not include regulatory concerns in the attitude model as this variable was unstable
when included, respondents did tend to report this to be a significant barrier to enrollment.
Regulatory tools have proven highly unpopular in similar contexts (Lurie et al. 2013), and
Sullivan et al. (1996) reported lack of trust in the government to be a high concern amongst
landowners. Despite informing respondents that the CRWP are not a regulatory body and
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as such stewardship programs would not involve regulatory repercussions, there remained
a high concern that enrollment would lead to regulatory implications.
The models showed a negative relationship between the enrollment and the
perception that stewardship programs would threaten the respondent’s livelihood, and I
believe these concerns are primarily a concern for a loss of the lifestyle associated with
using one’s land for production values. Similar studies of farmers have found a relationship
between the farming livelihood and lifestyle qualities such as independence (Sullivan et al.
l996) and closeness to nature (Schoon and Grotenhuis 2000). Kallstrom and Ljung (2005)
found that when farmers felt that they had reduced control in decision making due to
heightened regulation it threatened their ability to continue farming. As such, authority
tools are likely a contentious method to encourage stewardship behavior, and stewardship
programs should consider how to address this concern. For example, resource managers
may work with federal and state regulators to institute a property rights assurances that
participation will not lead to additional regulatory burden.
Incentive Tools assume individuals are utility maximizers, and attempt to
encourage or discourage voluntary behavior with financial or other tangible benefits. While
the PWS framework has attempted to encourage voluntary program participation through
financial incentives, my findings support the growing field of research that imply the
limited ability of PWS programs to fully account for landowner behavior. While financial
barriers were somewhat widely reported, I did not find a significant relationship between
enrollment intent and the perception of financial barriers or interest in receiving financial
incentives to participate. This may support the notion that watershed stewardship programs
have overemphasized financial payments to promote behavior, or it may indicate that
28

respondents currently believe that they will be sufficiently compensated for enrollment.
My findings support those reported by Ma et al. (2010), who described a conceptual model
in which PES payments were considered as one of many tools to encourage enrollment,
and demonstrated that for some farmers, payments simply will not change enrollment
decision.
My framing of financial considerations as a barrier may limit interpretation here.
While financial barriers and assistance overcoming those barriers may not significantly
improve enrollment, it is possible that financial incentives beyond covering basic
stewardship costs could still improve enrollment. Reimer and Prokopy (2014) found that a
“lack of perceived benefit” was a significant deterrent to participating; when financial
incentives are sufficient to outweigh the perceived risks associated with program
participation, it is possible that finances may act as motivators. However, large financial
incentives require substantial capital investment, and my findings imply that other tools
should be considered first as a means to alter attitude and to lower such high transaction
costs.
Capacity Tools assume individuals will partake in an action given the removal of
barriers, and as such these tools involve the provision of training and resources to enable
individuals to perform an action. My results suggest two primary barriers that may be
addressed through capacity tools: the belief that stewardship programs are “incompatible”
with a landowner’s goals for his/her land and the belief that landowners did not have
enough time to participate in such a program. Ma et al. (2010) reported a similar finding
that perception of incompatibility amongst a strictly farm population was a key limitation
to enrollment in stewardship programs. Individuals may be financially and technically
29

capable of participation, but if these programs are seen as an inconvenience, landowners
have little rationale to join.
Interestingly, I found that individuals who were responsive to receiving technical
assistance through a dedicated staff member who can help to implement program strategies
were significantly more likely to participate. This makes sense – some individuals will not
participate because they simply do not have the time to engage in an activity that is
incompatible with their primary land management objectives. However, receiving
technical assistance can help to overcome this hurdle.
Symbolic Tools assume individuals are motivated by internal judgments and
beliefs, and as such these tools attempt to showcase how a given policy direction is
consistent with an individual’s attitudes. My study focused on the importance of attitudes
and provides further empirical support for the utilization of symbolic policy tools to
encourage behavior. Amongst attitudes, I found lack of belief that functioning stream
ecosystems are important for clean water (the Ecosystem Belief) and a lack of trust in
conservation agencies (Trust Barriers) to be important deterrents to enrollment.
While individuals widely reported the Ecosystem Belief, those that did not hold this
belief were much less likely to enroll. This item is distinguished from other environmental
attitude items in that it focused on the outcomes of protecting ecosystem health rather than
the causes of ecosystem degradation. In another survey of rural landowners, Armstrong
and Stedman (2011) found a similar relationship; they failed to detect a relationship
between knowledge of water quality issues and intent to implement riparian buffers, but
they identified a strong relationship with belief in positive outcomes of buffer
implementation. This may suggest that, regardless of beliefs about the state of watershed
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degradation, individuals must first believe that protecting environmental attributes of the
watershed will lead to tangible improvements in water quality.
I found the perception of Trust Barriers to be a highly significant deterrent to
enrollment intent. Smith et al. (2013) described the importance of trust between individuals
and conservation agencies related to shared values and moral and technical competencies
– the belief that agencies can make ethically grounded decisions based on the best available
science. In one study, farmers reported lack of credibility of extension offices and NRCS
programs – often citing that these programs were underfunded, behind the times, and too
focused on expensive “special projects” (Woods et al. 2014). Another study noted that
farmers frequently felt excluded from meaningful engagement with conservation programs
and that the responsible agencies discounted farmer knowledge regarding the land
(Harrison et al. 1998). Some studies have suggested that conservation program outcomes
can be improved through social connections between individuals and other landowners
(Armstrong and Stedman 2011), or with conservation organizations (Flitcroft et al. 2009,
Muradian 2010). In these instances, conservation programs were successful because they
established relationships and larger social norms within the community. As a result, I
suggest that building trust between source water protection organizations and the local
community is a vital first towards program success. An alternative route may include
working through existing trusted organizations (such as local soil and water conservation
districts, watershed councils, or producer organizations) within the community who have
firmly established working relationships with landowners.
Surmounting initial barriers to enrollment will be difficult; respondents in the study
were highly averse to program enrollment when negative outcomes were perceived, and
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yet positive attitudes did not guarantee intent to enroll. To help overcome such aversion,
Lurie et al. (2013) suggested that enrollment may be encouraged by offering short term
contracts to allow landowners to participate on a trial basis, after which a more long-term
contract may be signed. Such trial programs may offer a key window in which relationships
can be built and the key attitudes of trust, ecological understanding, and perceptions of
incompatibility can be addressed.
5. CONCLUSION
This study represents landowners in a unique social, ecological, and political
landscape, and while my general critiques of PWS and emphasis on consideration of
alternate policy tools may be broadly applicable, my results re-affirm the importance of
community-based knowledge as a prerequisite to program success. There are likely few, if
any, universally significant independent variables to explain stewardship program
enrollment, and I join other authors who have called for the study of specific landowner
populations rather than grouping all landowners together (Greiner et al. 2009, Woods et al.
2014). I suggest that stewardship programs should allow sufficient flexibility to adapt not
only to the entire population, but when possible to each individual landowner’s needs and
objectives.
Studying the relationship between attitudes and stewardship program enrollment is
crucial not only because watershed-scale stewardship actions are mediated through
stewardship programs, but program enrollment has been linked with long term changes in
attitude (Wilson and Hart 2001). Provided that these changes in attitude are positive,
overcoming initial barriers to enrollment can be an important first step towards fostering a
widespread culture of stewardship.
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CHAPTER TWO
Stewardship Program Engagement with Diverse Landowners
In the previous chapter, I found evidence that land management objectives
influence attitude and stewardship intent. In this chapter, I dive deeper into this concept by
identifying distinct groupings of landowners dependent on their primary land management
objectives and creating typologies based on these objectives. I discuss key divisions in
perceived barriers to enrollment in stewardship programs between these typologies, as well
as how these typologies differ in their preferred incentives and management actions
relating to watershed stewardship.
1. INTRODUCTION
Watersheds often are comprised of a large number of landowners with diverse
interests and objectives for their land. In these cases, private landowners are the necessary
mediators by which downstream water quality is determined (Ahnstrom et al. 2008), and
understanding these objectives is crucial to engage these landowners in watershed
stewardship. In recent years, rising rates of exurban development have added additional
complexity and challenges to these landscapes, replacing large swaths of agricultural and
timber lands with amenity-driven rural landowners (Brown et al. 2005). These land use
changes have had important consequences for the both the ecological functioning of rural
landscapes as well as the dominant methods by which private lands are managed (Dale et
al. 2005).
Despite the rising rates of complexity in land ownership, most federal conservation
programs remain geared towards commercial agricultural and timber landowners. Many of
these programs rely on the classic agricultural economics assumption that operator
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landowners inherently make decisions based on the net profitability of these choices
(Koontz 2001), and as such are structured around offering financial incentives to promote
desired land management behaviors (e.g. Conservation Reserve Program, Environmental
Quality Incentives Program). While I have previously argued that such programs are not a
panacea for promoting stewardship amongst financially-motivated land operators, they
may be particularly problematic as a means to encourage behavior amongst the growing
numbers of landowners who do not rely on their land for financial gain (Koontz 2001).
As a first step towards designing and implementing conservation programs
compatible with a wider array of land management objectives, researchers have begun to
consider the inter-relationship between financial and non-financial objectives in describing
distinct groupings of landowners. At the coarsest level, landowners may be characterized
by their utilization of land or lack thereof for production and income – often manifested as
a distinction between foresters (Majumdar et al. 2008) or farmers (Kaplowitz and Witter
2008) and non-operator landowners. This distinction offers an easily identifiable way of
characterizing landowners based on external criteria, and such typologies can be somewhat
easily distinguished using simple demographic and property characteristics (e.g. Majumdar
et al. 2008, Nielsen-Pincus et al. 2015). Yet perhaps unsurprisingly, this simple dichotomy
appears insufficient to explain adoption of stewardship behaviors; for example, past studies
have found non-operator residential landowners to be both more (Kaplowitz and Witter
2008, Arbuckle et al. 2008) and less (Armstrong and Stedman 2011) likely to engage in
stewardship behavior compared with their producer counterparts. While the inclusion of
both producer and non-producer landowners in the land stewardship literature is an
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important first step, it appears that such categories are somewhat fluid (Majumdar et al.
2008) and more fine-scale description of land management objectives is needed.
A brief (and by no means exhaustive) review of the literature highlights the
increasing recognition of complexity associated with land ownership objectives. Kline et
al. (2000) measured the pursuit of lifestyle amenities in addition to profit and production
objectives to describe different types of landowners. Maybery et al. (2005) noted that many
landowners were divided in their views of the environment, and considered environmental
conservation as differentiating characteristic amongst landowners. More recently, NielsenPincus et al. (2015) identified five key land management considerations that could be used
to describe landowners in the wildland-urban interface: pursuit of natural/lifestyle
amenities, forest/timber management, home and family, agricultural production, and
development. Below, I explore in more detail the variety of objectives theorized to
influence producer and non-producer engagement with land stewardship initiatives.
1.1. Producers
Due to the large footprint and historical dominance of agricultural and forestry land
uses in the United States, adoption of stewardship practices amongst producer landowners
is well represented in the literature. While both farmers and foresters have expressed
general support for environmental outcomes in a variety of contexts, past research suggests
that perceived barriers may inhibit stewardship behavior. Napier et al. (1998) utilized
Rogers (1983) Diffusion model to explain participation in government sponsored soil
erosion control problems, and suggested that four key attitudes must be present in order for
a farmer to consider enrollment: the farmer must believe that (1) a problem exists, (2) the
costs of enrollment are reasonable, (3) the desired practices are relevant to farm operations,
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and (4) the benefits outweigh the costs. Fischer (2012) described similar set of conditions
necessary for engaging commodity-driven non industrial private forestlands (NIPF)
owners in stewardship initiatives, including perception of financial benefit, marketability,
and compatibility with their values as family forest owners. Further evidence supports the
notions that producer enrollment is ultimately dependent on whether such practices limit
or enhance land productivity (Woods et al. 2014), and whether or not the farmer perceives
a self-benefit to utilizing these practices (Reimer and Prokopy 2014). Additional barriers
to enrollment may include perception of regulatory limitations (Reimer and Prokopy 2014)
and risk (Greiner et al. 2009).
While the above literature provides a broad understanding of how producer
attitudes relate to enrollment in stewardship programs, the question remains: how and why
do producers differ in these key attitudes? Petrzelka et al. (1996) theorized that farmers can
be split as “sustainable” or “conventional,” defined by a view of whether humans should
dominate or harmonize with nature. Similarly, Sullivan et al. (1996) surveyed conventional
and organic farmers, and found that farmers in both groups shared many perceived barriers
and were not differentiated according to economic considerations, but were split by their
views on nature. Maybery et al. (2005) equate conventional farmers with those who are
driven primarily by economics, and sustainable farmers as those who are driven primarily
by maintaining the farming lifestyle and closeness to nature. Greiner et al. (2009) surveyed
ranchers in Australia and found that financial considerations did not appear to be an
important predictor of stewardship behavior, and instead stewardship was differentiated
primarily by level of interest in conservation and lifestyle objectives.
1.2 Non-Producers
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The heavy focus on commercial producers fails to represent the growing presence
of non-production oriented land management objectives represented within a typical
watershed (Rosenberg and Margerum 2008), including small acreage hobby farmers,
residential homeowners, and real estate investors. These groups may cumulatively have a
large impact on the landscape; between 1950 and 2000, the amount of land in the United
States populated at exurban densities increased five-fold, the majority of which has resulted
as the result of conversion of agricultural and forestry lands (Brown et al. 2005). Kaplowitz
and Witter (2008) compared non-commercial residential landowners to commercial
producers, and found that non-commercial landowners were generally more accepting of
their responsibility for watershed degradation and were more willing to place riparian
buffers on their lands. Conversely, Armstrong and Stedman (2011) compared a similar
population, and found that residential landowners were less willing to implement buffers
due to aesthetic preferences. Such unclear relationships suggest that all non-operator
homeowners cannot be classified into one category, and instead more fine-scale distinction
of objectives may further elaborate stewardship behavior.
Pannell and Wilkinson (2009) investigated residential landholders, and described
two major objectives: those driven by environmental objectives, and those driven by
aesthetic objectives. Similarly, Ryan (2009) differentiated non-commercial riparian
landowners by stewardship ethic, and suggested that stewardship related to perceptions of
personal accountability for watershed degradation and feasibility of restoration to be key
variables. Fischer (2012) split non-producer forest landowners objectives into three
classes: amenity (residents driven by the rural lifestyle), recreation (absentee landowners
who utilize the property as a second home), and passive (absentee landowners without a
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clearly defined ownership objective). The authors found that absentee landowners were
generally less likely to actively manage their land to minimize wildlife risk likely due to
perceptions of “inconvenience” for their limited time on their property. Petrzelka et al.
(2009) noted a similar relationship; absentee landowners tended to report a high interest in
conservation but exhibited low enrollment rates in conservation programs.
1.3 Research framework
The primary objectives of this research were to (1) test whether production
objectives influence perceived barriers and preferred methods of engagement with
stewardship programs, (2) classify landowners according to the relative importance of
production and less-easily identifiable land management objectives theorized to influence
stewardship behavior, and (3) compare how these groups differ in the aforementioned
perceived barriers and preferred methods of engagement. According to Nielsen-Pincus et
al. (2015), an effective landowner classification system will produce classes that are
“readily interpretable, represent distinct suites of landowner motivations, and link those
motivations to preferred land management strategies,” and I take a similar approach in
defining appropriate landowner classes. Based on my literature review, I expected
landowner typologies to be defined primarily by use of land for production purposes, with
further refinement by consideration of other objectives such as conservation, recreation, or
investment considerations. In general, I expected producers to perceive greater financial
barriers to enrollment and to be more interested in receiving financial incentives compared
with non-producers.
Following determination of landowner typologies, I explore the distribution of
landowners by comparing the makeup of four different sub-watersheds: the Clackamas
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mainstem, Clear Creek, Deep Creek, and Eagle Creek. These four watersheds are
characterized by similar sizes and land use makeup, and are difficult to distinguish from
one another by simply looking at tax parcel data. However, I hypothesized that the
distribution of landowner typologies may be different between subwatersheds and may
help to target policy interventions.
2. METHODS
Amongst other things, the survey instrument was designed to measure land
management objectives, property and demographic characteristics, perceived barriers to
enrollment in stewardship programs, and preferred methods of engagement with
stewardship programs. All analyses were performed in R Studio (Version 3.2.3).
2.1 Land Management Objectives
I asked respondents to rate the importance of various land management objectives
on a 5 point Likert scale from “not at all important” to “very important.” These objectives
included environmental, recreational, financial, and production oriented objectives.
Though similar studies separate farmers and foresters (e.g. Nielsen-Pincus et al. 2015), I
was interested in creating groups based on the more general relationship between land use
for production or for lifestyle, and I did not attempt to differentiated these groups from one
another.
To identify the underlying dimensions of land management objectives, I performed
an exploratory factor analysis using polychoric correlations on land management
objectives (‘Psych’ R Package, Revelle 2015) using varimax rotation. Polychoric
correlations are a modified version of the Pearson correlation coefficient used when an
ordinal variable is theorized to represent an underlying normally distributed variable (see
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Drasgow 1988) as is the case with Likert-scale data. I identified three factors which I
interpret to represent “Production” objectives (associated with the production and sale of
farm and/or timber products), “investment” objectives (associated with maximizing return
on investment or development potential), and “conservation” objectives (associated with
the pursuit environmental and to a lesser extent recreational objectives) (Table 2.1).
2.2 Production Objective Regression Models
In order to test if production objectives on their own could help to explain
differences in attitude, I performed an Ordinary Least Squares regression utilizing the
factor score from production as a predictor of each of the eight listed variables
independent of one another (Table 2.2, “coef” column). I considered production to be a
significant predictor of attitude when p < 0.05.
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Table 2.1
Univariate distributions and 3-factor solution for responses to: “How important are the following factors
when you are making decisions regarding your land?” Percent important indicates percentage of
respondents marking “important” or “very important.” (Factor loadings greater than 0.4 are bolded for
emphasis).
Rotated Factor Loadings
Percent
MeanA
SD
Goals and Objectives
Important
Product.
Conserv.
Invest.
Produce farm or timber products
38%
2.70
1.70
0.85
0
0.18
Provide income
27%
2.48
1.50
0.78
0.04
0.31
Run a business
20%
2.21
1.46
0.9
-0.01
0.3
Provide recreational opportunities
50%
3.43
1.34
0.11
0.44
0.2
Preserve open space
70%
3.97
1.23
-0.08
0.82
-0.05
Protect wildlife
75%
4.14
1.04
-0.05
0.89
-0.12
Protect local waterways
77%
4.21
1.05
0.04
0.79
0.1
Enhance investment potential
51%
3.40
1.40
0.3
0.13
0.67
Enhance development potential
21%
2.28
1.42
0.33
-0.05
0.72
Eigenvalue
2.37
2.31
1.25
% Variance explained
26%
26%
14%
A
Responses range from not at all important (1) to very important (5)

2.3 Landowner Typologies
I utilized the factor scores to perform a k-means cluster analysis to identify distinct
groupings of landowners by land management objective. I used the R base function
kmeans() to perform the cluster analysis using 10,000 iterations, which ultimately
converged on a five cluster solution. I assigned each of the respondents to the appropriate
cluster, and I calculated the mean of each measured land management objective for each
landowner cluster (Figure 2.1) and compared them to one another to create descriptive
landowner typologies.
2.4 Landowner and Property Characteristics
I queried socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents, including
education, income, political ideology, value of agricultural sales, ownership tenure, and
age. Using ESRI ArcGIS (version 10.2), I measured the total acreage owned by each
landowner by calculating the sum total acreage of all tax parcels registered to that
individual within the confines of the Clackamas River watershed. Additionally, I calculated
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the total kilometers of streams on each landowner’s property by overlaying tax parcels and
streams identified in the USGS National Hydrography Dataset. Last, I defined four
subwatersheds in which respondents were represented (Clackamas Mainstem, Deep Creek,
Clear Creek, and Eagle Creek) and assigned each landowner to the watershed in which they
had the greatest amount of property.
2.5 Barriers to Enrollment
I asked respondents to rate their level of agreement (from “strongly disagree” to
“strongly agree” with four statements explicitly relating to reasons that would prevent them
from enrolling in a watershed stewardship program. I chose these barriers to enrollment
based on those shown to influence landowners in the literature: practical barriers such as
financial limitations and time constraints (Williams 2002, Woods et al. 2014), and less
tangible barriers relating to lack of trust (Rosenberg and Margerum 2008, Smith et al. 2013)
and concerns for regulatory implications as a consequence of enrollment (Greiner et al.
2009, Kallstrom and Ljung 2005, Armstrong and Stedman 2011).
2.6 Preferred Methods of Engagement
I asked respondents to rate their likelihood of enrolling in a watershed stewardship
program if (a) offered any of 6 different incentives and (b) the program involved working
towards any of seven separate land management goals. I looked to reduce the number of
variables represented by performing an exploratory factor analysis on each of these two
groups, and creating indices by taking the mean of variables shown to represent an
underlying data structure. I evaluated the internal consistency of these indices by
calculating Chronbach’s alpha. This analysis revealed two main types of incentives:
“financial incentives” (alpha = 0.93) and “assistance implementing project” (alpha = 0.84);
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and two types of land management goals: “agrichemical reduction” (alpha = 0.89) and
“riparian habitat improvements” (alpha = 0.92).
2.7 Within Group Comparisons
I tested both for significant differences among landowner typologies and between
each group individually compared with all other groups combined (that is, whether each
group tends to be significantly higher or lower than the mean of all other groups). For
presence/absence (land use) and non-Likert ordinal (income, political tendency, and value
of agricultural sales) data, I utilized a Chi-square test for goodness of fit. Because this test
resulted in expected frequencies for some groups of less than 5, I utilized Monte Carlo pvalue simulations with 2000 replicates to create more conservative and accurate
representations of significance. I tested for differences in continuous data (age, ownership
tenure, log(property size), and log(stream length on property)) by running an analysis of
variance test (ANOVA). For Likert scale ordinal data (barriers and preferred methods of
engagement), I compared differences in means among groups by utilizing an ANOVA. I
tested for differences between groups by utilizing a Mann-Whitney U test, a nonparametric test that holds no assumption of normality and performs with almost equal
efficiency to the student’s t-test.
3. RESULTS
Seventy-two surveys (6.5%) were returned as undeliverable, leading to an effective
sample of 958. I received 268 responses with sufficient data to complete the cluster
analysis, representing 28% of the sample. Because the population contained both rural
residential and agricultural properties, I compared demographics and property
characteristics from respondents to both the most recent National Agricultural Statistics
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Service Census of Agriculture (USDA 2012) for Clackamas County and the most recent
American Community Survey (US Census Bureau 2009-2013) for census tracts
represented in the study area. Compared with these two data sources, the sample tended to
be older (median age 63) and more educated (48% with a college degree). Property size,
agricultural sales, gender, and income tended to fall within the range of values represented
by the reference sources.
Goals relating to conservation were the top land management objectives and
included “preserve open space” (mean = 3.97), “protect wildlife” (mean = 4.14), and
“protect local waterways” (mean = 4.21). “Provide recreational opportunities” (mean =
3.43) and “enhance investment potential” (mean = 3.4) were also widely reported.
production-oriented goals such as “produce farm or timber products” (mean = 2.70),
“provide income” (mean = 2.48), and “run a business” (mean = 2.21) were less frequently
reported, but had the highest standard deviations, reflecting the mixed sample of both
producers and non-producers. “Enhance development potential” (mean = 2.28) was also
infrequently reported (Table 2.1).
Respondents tended to agree that “regulatory barriers” (mean = 3.71) were the
greatest obstacle to enrollment in stewardship programs, followed by “trust barriers” (mean
= 3.31), “financial barriers” (mean = 3.20), and “time barriers” (mean = 3.1). Respondents
were generally ambivalent regarding the potential to receive “financial incentives” (mean
= 3.19), “assistance implementing project” (mean = 2.95), and to work towards
“fertilizer/pesticide reduction” (mean = 3.13). Respondents tended to most agree that they
would be interested in working towards “riparian habitat improvements” (mean = 3.72)
(Table 2.2)
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The factor scores for production objectives were negatively associated with the
perception of all barriers, and were particularly strongly associated with the perception of
Regulatory and Trust Barriers (p < 0.01). Furthermore, production objectives were weakly
negatively associated with interest in pursuing fertilizer/pesticide reduction goals (p<0.1)
(Table 2.2).
4. LANDOWNER TYPOLOGIES
The cluster analysis revealed five distinct landowner typologies, named according
to the importance each group placed on production, investment, and conservation
objectives (Figure 2.1). Two typologies reported particularly low production scores and
can be classified as non-producers: “Lifestyle Homeowners” (n = 69) and “Amenity
Investors” (n = 47). Two typologies reported particularly high production scores and can
be classified as producers: “Lifestyle Producers” (n = 53) and “High-value Producers” (n
= 46). The two non-producer typologies and the two producer typologies tended to respond
more similarly to one another compared with responses between producers and nonproducers. A fifth group, “Disengaged Landholders” (n = 53), reported low scores for all
three listed objectives and tended to be the most distinct group in terms of mean response.
These differences in land management objectives translated into differences among groups
regarding whether they tended to agree (>3), disagree (<3), or be neutral (~3) to each of
the perceived barriers and preferred methods of program engagement (Figure 2.2). In the
following sections, I describe each of these groups in more detail and attempt to interpret
the diversity of responses exemplified.
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Figure 2.1
Mean land management objectives and standard error bars compared between clusters. Primary factor
loading indicates the top factor on which each variable loaded onto.

4.1 Non-Producer Typologies
Non-producer typologies tended to report low production (mean < 2) and high
conservation scores (mean > 4), and tended to have smaller property sizes, report fewer
agricultural or forestry land uses on their land, and report little to no agricultural sales from
their property. Additionally, these two groups were the most likely typologies to reside on
their property (>90%). These non-producer typologies tended to perceive fewer barriers to
enrollment in stewardship programs and were generally more interested in working with a
stewardship program on the listed land management strategies. They were the only two
groups to not perceive time barriers to enrollment (mean < 3). However, Lifestyle
Homeowners and Amenity Investors were differentiated by their views of their property as
an investment; an objective which seems to weakly influence how these groups perceive
barriers and prefer to engage in watershed stewardship programs.
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Table 2.3
Land use, demographic, and parcel characteristics compared between landowner clusters. All data come
from survey responses except for Property Size and Stream Length, which were calculated using ArcGIS.
Landowner Clusters
ALL
LH
AI
LP
HP
DL
A
Land Use
Primary Residence***
82%
94%↑ 91%↑
81%
74%
68%↓
↓
↓
↑
↑
Agriculture***
39%
26%
9%
66%
65%
32%
Timber***
43%
28%↓ 26%↓ 62%↑ 57%↑ 47%
Pasture**
33%
35%
15%↓ 43%↑
41%
28%
A
Qualitiative Respondent Characteristics
Income > $100K (n=220)
37%
33%
35%
37%
46%
35%
Liberal Political Tendency (n=230)***
27%
46%↑
20%
29%
20%
17%↓
Conservative Political Tendency (n=230)***
48%
32%↓
43%
51%
55%
65%↑
9%↓
62%↑
42%
29%
2014 Sales < $50,000 (n=257)***
32%
22%↓
↓
↑
2014 Sales > $50,000 (n=257)***
9%
2%
4%
6%
28%
10%
B
Quantitative Respondent Characteristics
Age (mean years, n=241)
63.3
62.1
62.5
64.1
62.6
65.3
1
Ownership Tenure (mean years, n=247)**
27.6
28.0
21.6↓
33.7
30.7 34.4↑
2
Property Size (mean acres, n=266)***
27.0
14.0↓ 11.9↓ 40.7↑ 41.3↑ 31.7
Property Size (median acres, n=266)
12.4
8.6
6.1
24.1
22.3
18.4
2,3
Stream Length (mean km, n=266)***
1.0
0.9
0.8
1.3
1.4
1.4↑
Stream Length (median km, n=266)
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.6
1.0
0.9
Notes: 1Represents only ownership < 80 years to correct for outliers in data. 2Significance levels refer to
test on log-transformed data to correct for non-normality. 3Significant levels refer to only properties with
streams on site.
LH = Lifestyle Homeowners, AI = Amenity Investors, LP = Lifestyle Producers, IP = High-value Producers, DL
= Disengaged Landholders
A
All tests in section run with chi square test using Monte Carlo p-value simulations (2000 replicates).
B
All tests in section run using ANOVA
*significant within group differences at the <0.1 level, **at the <0.05 level; ***at the <0.01 level
↑
significantly higher at <0.05 level compared with all other groups combined
↓
significantly lower at <0.05 level compared with all other groups combined

4.1.1 Lifestyle Homeowners (n = 69, 26%)
Lifestyle Homeowners were the largest and generally the most enthusiastic group
about program enrollment, and they perceived significantly fewer trust barriers (mean =
2.84) and time barriers (mean = 2.81) than any other group. Additionally, this group is the
only landowner cluster that tended to be more politically liberal (46%) than conservative
(22%), a characteristic that firmly distinguishes them from Amenity Investors. While
respondents in this group are classified as “non-producers,” there were some reported
agricultural (26%), timber (28%), and pasture (35%) land uses, and 24% of this group
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reported some (primarily low value) agricultural sales in 2014. Therefore, production is
not excluded as a land use amongst these landowners, but it seems likely that productionoriented land uses are recreationally-driven.
4.1.2 Amenity Investors (n = 47, 18%)
Amenity Investors are characterized by somewhat higher recreational (~4) and
investment land management objectives (3-4) compared with Lifestyle Homeowners. They
responded similarly to Lifestyle Homeowners regarding perceived barriers and preferred
methods of program engagement, but tended to report somewhat higher Trust Barriers
(mean = 3.14) and a greater interest in receiving financial incentives (mean = 3.38). They
were least likely landowner group to report agricultural (9%) or pasture (15%) land uses,
and were also the least likely to report any agricultural sales (13%). However,
approximately 26% of this group reported Timber as a land use of their property, indicating
that a portion of this group may represent non-industrial private forestland owners (NIPF)
who may not actively manage their land for timber, but instead reserve the potential for
future timber harvest on their property. They had the shortest ownership tenure of any
group (mean = 21.6 years).
4.2 Producer Typologies
The two producer typologies were differentiated from other typologies primarily
by their high production scores and frequent agricultural and timber land uses. They tended
to own the largest properties (median > 22 acres) and reported the highest frequency of
agricultural sales (~70%). Both typologies tended to perceive more regulatory, trust, and
time barriers to enrollment compared with non-producer typologies. Additionally, where
non-producer typologies tended not to perceive financial barriers, producers weakly
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reported the perception of financial barriers (Lifestyle Producers mean = 3.41; High-value
Producers mean = 3.25). I did not detect a difference between interest in incentives between
producer and non-producer typologies; however, producers tended to be less interested in
the listed land management strategies compared with non-producers. The two classes of
producers were split primarily by their consideration of investment potential in their land
management.

Figure 2.2
A) Perceived barriers to enrollment in hypothetical watershed stewardship program among landowner
typologies. Scale ranges from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). The center line indicates neither
agree nor disagree (3).
B) Likelihood that listed incentives and goals would increase enrollment in hypothetical watershed
stewardship program among landowner typologies. Scale ranges from very unlikely (1) to very likely (5).
The center line indicates neither likely nor unlikely (3).
Significance levels on plot titles refer to results of ANOVA among all clusters for that variable. Significance
levels on error bars within plots refer to results of Mann-Whitney U Test of that group compared with all
other groups combined. To the right indicates significantly higher, whereas to the left indicates
significantly lower.
*significant at the <0.1 level, **at the <0.05 level, ***at the <0.01 level
LH = Lifestyle Homeowners, AI = Amenity Investors, LP = Lifestyle Producers, IP = High-value Producers, DL
= Disengaged Landholders
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4.2.1 Lifestyle Producers (n = 53, 20%)
Lifestyle Producers are differentiated from High-value Producers by their low
investment scores, marginally lower production scores, and marginally higher conservation
scores. This group was the most likely group to report low-value agricultural sales (62% <
$50,000), and was highly unlikely to report high value agricultural sales (6% > $50,000).
They tended to be somewhat more interested in fertilizer/pesticide reduction (mean = 3.17)
and substantially more interested in pursuing riparian habitat improvements (mean = 3.9)
compared with High-value producers. These individuals appear to represent low-value
producers who are motivated more by maintaining a rural lifestyle compared with
maximizing returns through their land management.
4.2.2 High-value Producers (n = 46, 17%)
High-value Producers are characterized by high scores for all three objectives
(mean > 4), and they were the most likely group to report high value agricultural sales
(28% > $50,000). They were most strongly differentiated from Lifestyle Producers by
consideration of their property for development potential (>4), and were less strongly
differentiated by a marginally higher investment score. They tended to be disinterested in
fertilizer/pesticide reduction (mean = 2.91) and marginally interested in pursuing riparian
habitat improvements (mean = 3.49). While this group values the recreational and
conservation aspects of landownership, they emphasize strong monetary motivations, and
their land management is likely to be ultimately influenced by whatever brings top dollar.
4.3 Disengaged Landholders (n = 53, 20%)
I identified one group – Disengaged Landholders – that was difficult to classify
according to land management objective as they reported low scores for all three listed
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objectives (mean scores < 3). Though this group reported low production scores, it was
difficult to label them as “non-producers” because this group was somewhat likely to report
agricultural (32%), timber (47%), and pasture (28%) land uses, and about half of this group
(49%) reported agricultural sales. This group is difficult to identify according to readily
available property or demographic characteristics, as they tended to fall somewhere
between producers and non-producers in terms of income and property size, and were only
marginally older than the other groups (mean age = 65.3 years, not significant). However,
three characteristics indicate that this group represents a distinct subset of landowners: they
were the least likely group to reside on their property (68%), tended to report significantly
longer ownership tenures compared with other groups (mean = 34.4 years), and they were
by far the most politically conservative group (mean = 65%).
4.4 Distribution of Landowner Typologies
I found no significant difference in the frequency of each cluster represented in
each subwatershed, but I did find a significant difference in relative percentage of stream
lengths represented between each watershed; Lifestyle Homeowners tend to dominate
Eagle Creek (35% of streams) and Deep Creek (30% of streams), whereas Disengaged
Landholders tend to dominate Clear Creek (35% of streams) and the Clackamas Mainstem
(25% of streams) (Figure 2.3). The percentage of stream kilometers represented tended to
be more even in the Clackamas Mainstem, which is geographically between Deep/Eagle
Creek and Clear Creek, showing a general increase in representation of conservation scores
from east to west across the watershed.
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Landowner Typologies

Figure 2.3
Proportion of stream length represented by each landowner cluster in each subwatershed (Chisq
p=0.0.0035). Inset maps identify subwatershed boundaries within the Clackamas River watershed.
LH = Lifestyle Homeowners, AI = Amenity Investors, LP = Lifestyle Producers, IP = High-value Producers, DL
= Disengaged Landholders

5. DISCUSSION
Landowners within the Clackamas River watershed demonstrated a diversity of
objectives, and this diversity translated into differences in perceived barriers and preferred
methods of engagement with stewardship programs. The relationship between land
management objectives and land stewardship is not new; Kline et al. (2000), Majumdar et
al. (2009), Fischer (2012), and others have come to similar conclusions. However, my
research adds clarity to the relationship between land management objective and
stewardship by (1) providing evidence that production objectives act as the dominant
variable relating to one’s interest in land stewardship, (2) suggesting that one’s
consideration of conservation and investment objectives moderate the influence of
production considerations, and (3) identifying the importance of disengaged landowners as
a small but potentially influential group who may require special policy interventions to
engage in stewardship, or who may be difficult to engage at all.
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5.1 Land Management Objective and Stewardship
As suggested by Koontz (2001), I expected that production objective would
correspond with greater financial barriers and greater interest in receiving financial
incentives. However, I found only marginal differences between producers and nonproducers relating to interest in incentives and no differences relating to perceived financial
barriers. Instead, producers differed from non-producers primarily in their greater
perception of barriers relating to trust, regulatory concerns, and perceived lack of time.
This may be explained by the fact that producers, regardless of ultimate financial motive,
are fundamentally in the business of managing land, whereas watershed stewardship
programs are in the business of changing land management behaviors. Therefore,
enrollment in a watershed stewardship program represents more than a single act; instead,
it represents a commitment to change long-standing behaviors.
Though few if any studies have compared perceptions of trust and concerns for
regulation between producer and non-producer typologies, I detected strong differences
between these groups in regards to these variables. The literature has mostly been silent on
these concepts amongst non-producers, but various authors have long suggested that lack
of trust and regulatory concerns can be important barriers amongst producers. Sullivan et
al. (1996) emphasized a widely reported lack of trust in the government amongst a diverse
group of farmers, and Harrison et al. (1998) emphasized that a common reason for lack of
trust related to farmers feeling excluded from meaningful engagement with conservation
programs. Kallstrom and Ljung (2005) found a widespread concern amongst farmers that
heightened regulation would threaten their ability to continue farming. Similarly, Greiner
et al. (2009) equated regulatory concerns as a primary risk factor for ranchers to engage
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with conservation agencies. One respondent described that these concepts of trusts and
concerns for regulation are in fact closely related; “As for trust in governmental
organizations, mandates and burdens by the state legislature and appointed committees
consisting of people who own no forest land and do not understand those who do, bothers
me greatly." A common underlying theme amongst all of these findings is that producers
feel policy makers cannot be trusted to represent their unique goals and needs.
Contrary to suggestions that producers can be split into “sustainable” and
“conventional” (Maybery et al. 2005) categories based on land management objective, my
findings suggest that producers were perhaps more effectively differentiated according to
consideration of their property’s investment potential. Lifestyle Producers” and “Highvalue Producers” reported only modest differences in conservation score, but were starkly
differentiated in their investment scores. These differences translated into a greater interest
in pursuing fertilizer/pesticide reduction goals and riparian habitat improvements amongst
Lifestyle Producers. This may be due to the fact that riparian restoration activities and
fertilizer/pesticide reduction may be associated with decreases in land productivity. While
Lifestyle Producers may be more accepting of such strategies because such losses in
productivity are unlikely to diminish their ability to continue their farming lifestyle, Highvalue Producers may be concerned by the potential loss in profitability.
Past studies have tended to consider non-producers to be motivated primarily by
lifestyle objectives (Nielsen-Pincus et al. 2015, Fischer 2012); while I found this to be true
for both Amenity Investors and Lifestyle Homeowners, the data suggest that non-producers
may exhibit more diversity in objective than previously described as these groups were
divided by their interest in utilizing their property for investment and development
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purposes. However, this diversity did not translate into substantial differences in response,
as these two groups reported only minor differences in perceptions of Trust Barriers. It is
likely that further data relating to more investment-specific land use considerations are
needed to help understand if and how these landowner groups differ.
5.2 The Special Case of Disengaged Landholders
Disengaged Landowners were difficult to describe and even more difficult to
understand as they reported a wide diversity of land uses, were generally the most negative
group, and yet were characterized by a general lack of strong land management objectives.
This group may represent an important new grouping that is less easily characterized by
the traditional concepts of land ownership objectives. It is possible that this group
represents “non-cooperators,” individuals averse to stewardship programs in general who
tend to disagree with all statements. Finley et al. (2006) observed a similar group of forest
landowners in a survey of landowner interest in working with neighbors on stewardship
objectives. Similarly, Kline et al. (2000) described a group of “passive [forestland] owners”
who were motivated primarily by the gratification of property ownership but were not
motivated to engage in active land management. Most likely, additional research is needed
to accurately represent the land ownership objectives of this group; some potential land
management objectives that we did not measure may include a high value of independence
(Sullivan et al. 1996, Greiner at al. 2009) or pursuit of peace and quiet (Maybery et al.
2005, Nielsen-Pincus et al. 2015).
Notably, Disengaged Landholders were characterized by high rates of political
conservatism (65%). This partly explains this groups lack of interest in enrollment; past
decades have seen increasing polarization in political ideology regarding support for
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environmental programs, with conservatives tending to lack support (Nielsen-Pincus et al.
2014). While political ideology may be an important consideration of this group, this
variable may be difficult to consider when establishing initial relationships with
landowners; therefore, it is important to consider more readily available demographic
information.
There were two defining demographic features of this group that may help to
explain the observed trends – they were the least likely group to reside on their property,
and they were the group with the longest mean ownership tenure. The high rate of absentee
landownership may partially explain the generally negative attitudes and high barriers
perceived by this group; Creighton et al. (2002) suggested that lack of on-site residence of
a similar population may have led to a diminished sense of place and subsequent lack of
stewardship ethic. Bourassa (1991) described the concept of the non-resident as the
“detached outsider” who is more concerned with visual aesthetics and less concerned about
emotional or symbolic aspects of place.
This phenomenon is typically used to describe visitors and not landowners, and it
does not fit well with my observation that Disengaged Landholders tended to report the
longest ownership tenure of any group. This fact, coupled with the high rate of absentee
landownership and the high average age of Disengaged Landholders, could indicate that
many of these individuals are long-time landowners who are no longer able to reside on
and/or actively manage their property, and instead they may be legacy landholders who are
uninterested in actively pursuing any active management objectives on their property. This
description certainly does not describe all landholders in this group, as this group
represented a large range of demographic and parcel characteristics, and it appears likely
57

that a far greater combination of explanatory variables explain the trends observed in this
group.
The very recognition of this group is particularly important as they were the
dominant landowner type in two subwatersheds and tend to be highly negative and offer
few signals for preferred methods of engagement, if any, with stewardship programs. They
tended to be highly uninterested in receiving technical or educational assistance, and were
close to neutral regarding interest in receiving financial incentives. This may correspond
with findings from Fisher (2012), who noted that a group of absentee forestland owners
tended to view fuel treatments as inconvenient. She suggests offering third party
contractors to perform on-site work, which may decrease the burden associated with
stewardship.
5.3 Landowner Targeting
Majumdar et al. (2009) and Nielsen-Pincus (2015) stress the importance of having
information about landowner typology demographics, parcel characteristics, and location
to help policy makers target policy interventions. My research further shows the
practicality of this concept – to an extent. While I noted substantial differences in property
characteristics between non-producers and producers/absentee landowners, I was unable
to identify easily recognizable demographic and parcel characteristics between more
specific landowner typologies. Such easily recognizable traits alone would be unable to
identify the divide in attitude between Lifestyle Homeowners and Amenity Investors, as
well as the divide between Lifestyle Producers and High-value Producers. However, this
may suggest that a good starting place to discuss land stewardship may be to first gain an
understanding of an individual’s land management objectives.
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Contrary to Nielsen-Pincus et al. (2015), I did not detect significant differences
between landowner frequencies between different subwatersheds. However, I did find
differences in the portion of stream that each landowner typology represented. This may
be an even more important metric, as it suggests that Eagle Creek and Deep Creek may be
particularly fruitful areas to focus on stream intervention due to the large portion of stream
represented by Lifestyle Homeowners, whereas Clear Creek may be a less cost effective
area for restoration due to the heavy presence of Disengaged Landowners.
Each of these sub-watersheds contain similar makeups of agricultural, forestry, and
residential land uses, but face different water quality stressors. Data regarding landowner
typologies can be coupled with existing information regarding concerns in the watershed
to help policy makers to prioritize areas for intervention. The Clackamas sub-basin Total
Maximum Daily Load (DEQ 2006) listed water quality standard exceedances for bacteria
in the Clackamas Mainstem, Deep Creek, and Clear Creek watersheds, and exceedance for
temperature in the Clackamas Mainstem and Eagle Creek watersheds. The current
Clackamas Agricultural Water Quality Management Plan (ODA 2015) specified that Deep
Creek is the top priority for agri-chemical reductions in the watershed, followed by Eagle
and Clear Creeks. This suggests that watershed stewardship programs may want to start
initiatives focused on riparian restoration and shade provisioning amongst the relatively
liberal and engaged Lifestyle Homeowners in Eagle Creek; another initiative may focus on
septic system upgrades amongst Lifestyle Homeowners to address bacterial loadings in
Deep Creek; and a third initiative may focus on working with the relative high frequency
of Lifestyle Producers in the Clackamas mainstem. While limiting program interventions
to these areas are unlikely to achieve significant improvements in water quality, these
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suggestions offer strong starting places by which to establish a reputation, build trust, and
achieve early on the ground program successes.
5. CONCLUSION
My findings lead to four primary conclusions: (1) land management objectives may
be closely related to engagement with stewardship programs; (2) production objectives act
as a master variable that is moderated by conservation and investment objectives, (3) some
landowners are more easily classified according to a general lack of interest as opposed to
strong land management objective, and (4) financial incentives are of limited utility
amongst all described landowner typologies.
1. As suggested by Nielsen-Pincus et al. (2015), I was able to detect 5 distinct
landowner clusters with distinct motivations for land management that were readily
interpretable and were able to be linked with differences in preferred land
management strategies. However, my findings suggest that some diversity in land
management objective is difficult to predict by simply observing demographic and
land use characteristics. Further research (similar to Sullivan et al. 1996) is needed
to examine whether differences in land management objective translates into onthe-ground conservation action.
2. Landowners differentiated by production objective (e.g. producers and nonproducers) tended to be consistently different from one another in terms of mean
response, whereas investment and conservation objectives provided less strong
differentiations between groups. However, this divide in production consideration
does not correspond to divide in perception of financial barriers or interest in
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financial incentives (contrary Koontz 2001); instead, I found less tangible
differences of opinion relating to lack of trust and concern for regulation.
3. Some landowners (e.g. disengaged landholders) are not easily classified according
to traditional concepts of land ownership objective; additional research is needed
to understand the objectives driving land ownership in this group.
4. Financial barriers were weakly perceived and financial incentives were weakly
desired across all landowner typologies. This general lack of interest in the financial
aspects of watershed stewardship supports critiques (Engel et al. 2008, Pirard et al.
2010) and findings (Greiner et al. 2009, Ma et al. 2010) regarding the limited utility
of incentives to encourage widespread adoption of stewardship behavior.
In conclusion, I make the fairly obvious but important claim that the first
consideration for engaging with landowners should be to understand their ultimate
objectives for land ownership, as this may provide a tremendous amount of insight into
their needs preferred methods of engagement. Identifying landowner typologies is an
important exercise in demonstrating the diversity of objectives represented in a watershed,
but applying these concepts require individual-scale attention, collaboration, and
consideration.
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FINAL THOUGHTS
I have spent the last two years pouring over journal articles, crunching numbers,
and staring into space trying to make sense of a jumble of data. While navigating through
the scholarship of it all, it can be difficult to forget that this research is not about “Amenity
Investors,” or “Lifestyle Producers,” or even landowners at all. It is fundamentally about
people, real people, who have their own unique stories and perspectives on land
stewardship. If there is one thing that I have learned, it is people cannot be neatly classified,
and behavior cannot be cleanly explained. The best that we can do is to try to acknowledge
this diversity in the experience of land ownership so that, as policy makers and resource
managers, we can better conserve the land and serve the people connected to it.
This work challenged me and my worldview. I am a longtime outdoorsman; a
fisherman, a backpacker, a climber, a paddler. I am also a longtime environmentalist, and
I thought my perspectives on what it meant to steward the land were set. I have enjoyed an
occasional trip into the Clackamas River watershed to fish, or to hike along the Clackamas
River trail, or to get away from the noise and people so inescapable at my home in Portland.
My relationship with the Clackamas, and with nature in general, is one primarily of
recreation. I head into rural places when I want to escape the city; I leave when I am
finished. As a consequence, I have never come to know a piece of land, its changes with
the season, and its connections to the surrounding landscape like the people who live on it.
I don’t know what it’s like to rely on a piece of land for my livelihood or my lifestyle or
my identity, and I don’t know what it’s like to have such an integral part of my self be
subjected to regulation, non-profit intervention, and downstream interests. I have been
humbled to hear from people who do. Almost all respondents reported high “conservation
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objectives” for their land, and almost all demonstrated an understanding of the relationship
between healthy ecosystems and clean water. But while these might be my only objectives,
landowners must balance these objectives with sometimes conflicting values, and they are
faced with hard choices about how to responsibly manage their land.
Policy makers have long addressed rural land management issues with an
oversimplified notion that people are both limited by and motivated by money, and the
payments for environmental services framework has partly grown out of this concept.
Resounding throughout my work is a finding that finances are not a primary barrier to land
stewardship in the Clackamas watershed, and accordingly financial incentives are not a
panacea to accomplish water quality objectives. Instead, a common theme that emerged
was that individuals were limited more by a lack of trust and a general feeling that
stewardship initiatives were incompatible with their lifestyle. To say that money is not a
concern would be foolish; money talks, and we all operate within the confines of what
money allows. However, to say that money can be directly translated into stewardship
outcomes would be downright wrong. Financial incentives are necessary to overcome those
final hurdles to land stewardship, but what is really needed are human connections,
common goals, and a more broad-scale understanding of the inter-connectedness of all who
live, work, and rely on the Clackamas River watershed. These are the building blocks on
which a culture of stewardship can be fostered.
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APPENDIX B. DATA SUMMARY REPORT
This report was prepared for the Clackamas River Water Providers and was submitted in
January of 2015. It presents raw data and general trends noted in the survey, and is
intended for use by practitioners as well as for distribution to the public.
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